"The monetary policy framework of the ECB" by Bofinger, Peter
Attachments at end
The monetary policy framework of the ECB
Peter Bofinger
Universität Würzburg
1.  Introduction
When the ECB started its operations in January 1999, it was confronted with the difficult task
of conducting monetary policy in a completely new environment. This implied an especially
high degree of uncertainty about the transmission process (ECB 1999, p. 45):
•  As the regime shift to a common monetary policy was likely to change the way
expectations are formed, there was a risk that empirical relationships between economic
variables that have been estimated using data from the past may become unstable. Such
changes were expected above all for the financial sector were the impact of Monetary
Union was most pronounced. As a consequence, the information content of monetary
aggregates was lower than under normal conditions.
•  In addition, the creation of European Monetary Union had led to an entirely new economic
area for which comprehensive and harmonised data had not been collected in the past. A
number of fully, or almost fully, harmonised series become available just at the beginning
of Monetary Union (monetary data, the balance of payments data and the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices). As these euro area-wide statistics are based, in part, on new
concepts, the properties of the series were well known.
In this short presentation I cannot discuss the concrete definition of the ECB’s final target
which is an increase of the harmonised index of consumer prices in he euro area of “below 2
percent”. Thus,  I will focus on the monetary policy framework that the ECB has developed in
order to achieve its target. In its own view the ECB has developed a completely new strategy
which it calls “stability-oriented monetary policy strategy”:
“The Eurosystem’s stability-oriented monetary policy (...) is a new and distinct strategy,
which reflects the unique circumstances and institutional environment that will face the
Eurosystem.” (ECB 1999, p. 50).Basically the ECB’s approach rests on two or even three “pillars”:
•  The first pillar is provided by a “reference value” for the money stock M3, with which the
ECB intends to assign a “prominent role” to money and which can be regarded as a weak
form of monetary targeting.
•  As the second pillar the ECB has established a “broadly based assessment of the outlook of
price developments”. While one could think that this pillar has some affinity to the concept
of inflation targeting, we will see that the ECB does not subscribe this view.
•  An implicit third pillar is a strategy of flexible exchange rates for the relations of the euro
vis-à-vis the yen and the dollar.
2. The first pillar: A reference value for the money stock M3
In contrast to the Bundesbank, the ECB has not decided to pursue an outright monetary
targeting. This can be explained by the fact that of the two requirements for an intermediate
target only one is met in the euro area. As far as the control of inflation by the money stock is
concerned the ECB states:
“(...), substantial or prolonged deviations of monetary growth from the reference value
would, under normal circumstances, signal risks to price stability of the medium term.”
(ECB 1999, p.  48).
The problematic issue is the control of the money stock M3 with short-term interest rates. [4]
Here, the ECB concedes:
“(...), the euro area monetary aggregate for which the reference value is announced does
not need to be controllable in the short run, using a short-term interest rate influenced
closely by the Eurosystem.” ECB (1999, p.  48)
Thus, it is consequent that the ECB decided to adopt only a weak form of monetary targeting
in the form of a “reference value” for the money stock M3. The rationale of a “reference
value” is explained by the ECB (1999, p. 48) as follows:
“However, the concept of a reference value does not entail a commitment on the part of
the Eurosystem to correct deviations of monetary growth from the reference value over
the short term. Interest rates will not be changed “mechanistically” in response to such
deviations in an attempt to return monetary growth to the reference value.“Thus, one could say that the ECB uses the monetary growth not as intermediate target but as a
“prominent” indicator of medium-term risks for price stability. But a main problem of this
approach is the low quality of monetary growth rates if they are used as the single indicator of
price stability.[5] Figure 1 shows that especially since 1995 the growth rate of M3 is not very
closely related to the inflation rate in the euro area.
As far as the derivation of the reference value is concerned, we have already seen that the
ECB has completely adopted the Bundesbank’s potential formula and even the concrete
values of its determinants. In contrast to the Bundesbank, the ECB formulates the reference
value not in the form of a target corridor. Instead it compares a three-month moving average
of annual growth of M3 with its reference value.
While there are some minor differences between the ECB’s and the Bundesbank’s approach,
[6] they both share the problem that they have not been designed as a medium-term
benchmark. In the case of the Bundesbank this was due to annual targets and the practice of
the base shifts, ie the use of actual values instead of normative values as the starting base for
the subsequent year. In the case of the ECB the medium-term orientation gets lost because of
the comparison with annual growth rates. This has the effect that an excessive monetary
growth in one year will simply grow out of the data as soon as twelve months have passed.
Therefore, the only consequent application of a reference value would be a comparison with
long-term monetary growth rates. In other words, the present practice of the ECB is not
compatible with the aim of identifying medium-term risks to price stability.
In the actual monetary policy of the ECB, the influence of the monetary pillar cannot be easily
identified. As already mentioned, the main problem of this approach is the confusion about
the interest rate elasticity of M3. The ECB and many of its watchers erroneously believe in a
negative elasticity of M3 in regard to short-term interest rates. But this is simply wrong.
Therefore the first interest rate decision of the ECB, a reduction of interest rates in April
1999, when the monetary growth rate was about one percentage point above the reference
value was
                                                
 Svensson (1999: 34) states: “It  is easily shown (...) that such a money-growth indicator will be a relatively useless indicator of risks to
price stability and, indeed, mostly a noisy indicator of the deviation of current inflation from the inflation target.”•  incorrect as far as the ECB’s understanding of the interest elasticity is concerned, and
•  correct as far as the true elasticity is concerned.
In the following decisions to increase interest rates the ECB has always emphasised a
negative impact of  short-term interest rates on the growth rate of money. For instance, at a
press conference on 6 July 2000 Duisenberg (2000) made the following statement:
“The increase in ECB interest rates on 8 June - in conjunction with the interest rate
increases made since November 1999 - exerts a  moderating influence on both money
and credit growth” .
9.1.1  The second pillar: a broadly based assessment
At first sight, this pillar seems to be identical with an inflation forecast by the ECB with a
confidence band. However, the ECB tries to avoid that term “forecast” although it is not clear
why an “assessment of the outlook for price developments” should be qualitatively different
from an “inflation forecast”.
This assessment is based on “a wide range of economic indicators” which “will include many
variables that have leading indicator properties for future price developments” (ECB 1999, p.
49) . They “include inter alia:
•  wages,
•  the exchange rate,
•  bond prices and the yield curve,
•  various measures of real activity,
•  fiscal policy indicators,
•  price and cost indices and
•  business and consumer surveys”. (ECB 1999, p. 49)
It is somewhat astonishing that this pillar does not include monetary data (money stocks
and/or short-term interest rate). Of course, the ECB could argue that this information is
already processed by the first pillar, but it is nevertheless difficult to understand how an
assessment of future price developments can be made without such indicators and how the
relationship of the two indicators is to be interpreted. .The presentation of this “assessment” by the ECB looks very much like a “look at everything
strategy” (Bernanke et al. 1999, p. 22). This would not be objectionable, but in this case this
pillar could not be regarded as a major contribution to the transparency of the ECB. It would
simply state what is obvious: the ECB wants to take into account all information that is
relevant for future price developments.
4. The ECB lacks a clear policy framework
It is widely agreed that a strategy or a policy framework serves two main purposes: By
reducing the complexity of the reality to set of relatively simple rules it helps
•  to facilitate internal decision processes of a central bank, and
•  to structure the dialogue with the public which contributes to the transparency,
accountability and hence credibility of monetary policy.
The discussion of both pillars of the ECB’s stability-oriented monetary policy strategy shows
that this strategy is at the same time too narrow and too general to serve as a framework that
could fulfil these two functions. While the first pillar pays too much attention to monetary
growth, the second pillar simply states that the ECB will look at all relevant factors. In
addition, it is not clear what has to be done if the two pillars give contradicting signals.
The ambiguity of the ECB’s strategy raises the question of how the ECB takes its interest rate
decisions. At the moment the experience with the ECB is still relatively limited so that no
definitive answer can be given. But there some indications that the Taylor rule - in the same
way as in the case of the Bundesbank - provides a relatively good explanation of the level and
of the changes in the ECB’s interest rates. Figure 1 shows that the repo rate in the euro area
has always been relatively close to a  Taylor rate on the basis of  the core inflation rate for the
euro area, an inflation target of 2 % and an assumed average short-term rate of 2.8 %. As
Gerlach and Schnabel (1999: 4) show, with such a policy the ECB does “not deviate much
from past (weighted) interest rate behaviour in the countries forming the EMU area.”
It seems relatively obvious that the ECB needs a more coherent policy framework. Above all,
the monetary pillar should be integrated in the “broadly based assessment”. As this wouldlead to a single-pillar approach, the “broadly based assessment” would have to become more
informative than now. Thus  many critics encourage the ECB to adopt the inflation targeting
framework of the Bank of England (Buiter 1999, Svensson 2000).
5. What the ECB can learn from inflation targeting
After its introduction by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in April 1988, the concept of
inflation targeting is now practised by an increasing number of central banks all over the
world. Many academics regard this concept as an “apparent success” (Svensson 2000) and
recommend it also for the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve System (Bernanke
et al. 1999). This view is difficult to reconcile with the monetary policy in the United States
under the aegis of Alan Greenspan which is widely regarded as successful although it lacks a
clearly defined  conceptual framework. The need for a switch to inflation targeting is also not
obvious in the case of the ECB which has been able to keep inflation expectations at
historically very low levels in spite of much public scepticism about the new currency.
In the following we will discuss what the introduction of inflation targeting would imply for
the ECB’s strategy. Above all we will analyse whether it is true that this approach would
increase the ECB’s accountability vis-à-vis the European public (Buiter 1999)
5.1 Elements of  inflation targeting
In a comprehensive study on “inflation targeting” Bernanke et al. (1999) give the following
definition of inflation targeting:
“Inflation targeting is a framework for monetary policy characterised by the public
announcement of official quantitative targets (or target ranges) for the inflation rate over one
or more time horizons, and by explicit acknowledgement that low, stable inflation is monetary
policy’s primary long-run goal. Among other important features of inflation targeting are
vigorous efforts to communicate with the public about plans and objectives of monetary
authorities, and in many cases, mechanisms that strengthen the central bank’s accountability
for attaining those objectives.“ (Bernanke et al. 1999, p. 4)
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 An additional element of “inflation targeting” as it is presented in the study by Bernanke et al. is a preference for an inflation target that is
set by “elected officials”: “Because ultimately policy objectives in a democracy must reflect the popular will, they should be set by elected
officials.” (Bernanke et al. 1999, p. 312). We do not discuss this aspect because it would be completely incompatible with the legal
independence of the ECB stipulated by the EC Treaty.This definition is much less demanding than a definition that was made by Lars Svensson who
can be regarded as the theoretical head of inflation targeting :
„Inflation targeting is characterised by, first, an explicit numerical inflation target. The
inflation target is pursued in the medium run, with due concern for avoiding real instability,
for instance, in the output-gap; that is, inflation targeting is ‘flexible’ rather than ‘strict’.
Second, due to the unavoidable lags in the effects of instruments on inflation, the decision
framework is in practice ‘inflation-forecast targeting’ (...). Third, communication is very
explicit and to the point; policy decisions are consistently motivated with reference to
published inflation and output(-gap) forecasts.“ (Svensson 2000, p.1)
Although the ECB does not regard itself as an inflation targeter, it is obvious that it can easily
meet most of the criteria listed in these two definitions:
•  “Low, stable inflation” is clearly the ECB’s “primary long-run goal”. It is defined in an
unambiguous way by Article 105 of  the EC-Treaty.
•  As already mentioned in its “stability-oriented monetary policy” the ECB (1999, p. 46)
has announced a quantitative target range for the inflation rate: “Price stability shall be
defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)
for the euro area of below 2%”.% The time horizon has also been specified: “Price stability
is to be maintained over the medium-term.”
•  With its Monthly Bulletin, the monthly press conferences and the quarterly hearings
before the Committee on Monetary and Economic Affairs of the European Parliament the
ECB is certainly undertaking “vigorous efforts to communicate with the public about
plans and objectives”.
Thus, as far as the criteria of  Bernanke at al. are concerned, the ECB’s approach  - and by the
way also the Bundesbank’s policy in the period from 1975 to 1998 – could easily qualify as
inflation targeting. Thus, in order to identify the specific features of  inflation targeting, the
more demanding definition by Svensson is required. It makes clear that an adoption of
inflation targeting would indeed require major changes in the ECB’s strategy.
•  The ECB’s decision framework would have to become “inflation forecast targeting”.
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By adopting these strategic elements, the ECB’s policy would become very similar to the
policy of the Bank of England, the  Reserve Bank of New Zealand or Sveriges Riksbank.
5.2 An accountability deficit of the ECB
Given the complexity of the macroeconomic process, the need of a clear decision framework
is obvious. By reducing the complexity to a set of relative simple rules, it  provides a
navigation system for monetary policy. This is needed for the internal decision processes
within a central bank as well as for the communication with the public. Thus, the proponents
of inflation targeting believe that this strategy would enhance the accountability of the ECB
(Buiter 1999, Svensson 2000).
An intensive discussion between Willem Buiter (1999) and Otmar Issing (1999) shows that
“accountability” is also not a clearly defined concept of economics. As a starting point one
can agree with Issing (1999) that “given its European mandate and independent status, the
Eurosystem as whole can only be held accountable by the European public and its elected
representatives”. In addition it seems useful to distinguish between two forms of
accountability:
•  Ex-post accountability seems to be the ECB’s main interpretation of accountability.4 It
implies that the central bank has to justify ex-post if it has been unable to meet its target.
•  Ex-ante  accountability implies that the public is provided with an early warning system
that allows to monitor a central bank’s decisions on a permanent and to detect inflationary
risks at an early stage. Thus, the central bank becomes accountable already for deviations
of inflation forecasts from the target value.
It is obvious that the whole discussion on monetary policy strategies is only relevant in the
context of ex-ante accountability.  We have already argued that so far the experience with the
“two pillar approach” of the  ECB indicates that this strategy is indeed not been sufficiently
transparent:
                                                
4 See Duisenberg (1999): Thus, publication of the forecasts cannot contribute to accountability. Rather, its performance in maintaining price
stability in the medium term should be used by the public to judge the success of the Eurosystem”Therefore, it is certainly justified if many academics urge the ECB to adopt a more
transparent and more accountable framework. The question is whether inflation targeting as is
currently practised, could provide the right alternative.
5.3 The framework of the Bank of England (BoE)
As the Bank of England can be regarded as one of the most sophisticated users of inflation
targeting, we will start with a short description of its policy framework. It can be characterised
by  two basic rules:
•  Monetary policy should be focused on keeping an inflation forecast close to the
announced inflation target of 2.5%. Thus, Svensson (1998)  calls this approach “inflation-
forecast targeting”. The inflation forecast can be regarded as an intermediate target of
monetary policy.
•  When the forecast exceeds (falls short of) the target, short-term interest (the operating
target) have to be increased (decreased).
In the inflation targeting framework the inflation forecast plays a similar  role as the monetary
target in the strategy of monetary targeting. Thus, for the transparency of inflation targeting
the derivation of the inflation target is extremely important. The BoE provides its ”inflation
projection" in a quarterly “Inflation Report” together with a projection for real GDP. The
forecast is presented as a conditional  forecast, ie it is based on the assumption of a constant
short-term interest rate- and is made for a time horizon of two years in advance. The inflation
projected is presented in the form of the so-called “fan chart” which  can be regarded like a
contour map.
Andrew Haldane (1997, p. 21), a senior economist at the BoE, explains how the Bank’s
inflation projection is produced:
/*+"+++'56"+."7+
3".)8+ "+ +.
.$9:$:$)1
+ '56 "+ "7          .     
.$)	)))*+""++.+""+
 +   	))))   ;".6 .  ..   
                                                
-..""+. +8$'5.# < ++5.")) =$. ""  +  ">5  + + 
         $  + +  
>")?
5.4 The information content of the BoE’s inflation forecast
It seems obvious that this procedure which the Chief Economist of the BoE, John Vickers
(1998) regards as “literally indescribable in detail” is anything but transparent. Thus,  as far as
the internal decisions are concerned, inflation targeting can offer little to reduce the
complexity of the decision process. Bernanke et al formulate this as follows:
“(...) , at a technical level, inflation targeting does not provide simple, mechanical operating
instructions to the central bank. Rather inflation targeting requires the central bank to use
structural and judgmental models of the economy, in conjunction of whatever information it
deems relevant, to pursue its price-stability objective. In other words, inflation targeting is
very much a ‘look at everything’ strategy, albeit one with a focused goal.” (Bernanke et al
1999, p. 22).
Therefore, the guidance that inflation targeting provides to the decision-makers in the central
bank’s governing board can be summarised in three simple do’s and don’ts :
•  “Adopt a forward looking approach in monetary policy ”. But this has been widely known
for a long time.
•  “Do not rely on a single indicator like the money stock”. This has always been  the
practice of all central banks;  even the Bundesbank was never paying too much attention
to its monetary targets (Clarida and Gertler 1996, Schächter 1999).
•  “Look at everything”. This is exactly the opposite what one would expect from a decision
framework.
Given the prominent role of the inflation forecast in the whole exercise, it  cannot be expected
that such an “eclectic approach”  will contribute to the accountability of monetary policy. The
public and its elected representatives which are hardly able to make their own technical
forecasts have no possibility to check by themselves whether the forecast is correct or not. As
a central bank is basically a bureaucracy like any other, there is always the risk that it will
produce a biased forecast in order to avoid public criticism. In addition as the forecast is
conditional on the actual interest rate level, it cannot be compared with outside forecasts that
are made on a projected interest rate path. In addition its information content is very limited.What the public wants to know is whether there is a realistic interest rate path that allows to
meet the inflation target within the foreseeable future. But what they can learn from the
conditional forecast is  what will happen under a hypothetical  interest rate level. Thus, the
only reliable information that can be derived from the publication of the forecast is the
direction of interest rate changes, as a deviation of the conditional forecast from the target is a
clear indication that the present level cannot be maintained. However, as the experience with
the interest rate policy of the Fed, the Bundesbank and now the ECB shows the trend of
interest rates is most of the time relatively clear.
5.5 What experts can learn from an inflation forecast
A central bank’s inflation forecast could, therefore, mainly be of interest for the group of
experts in private and official institutions that produce their own forecasts. In contrast to the
public they are able to check the central bank’s forecast which allows them to use it for an
assessment of the competence of the central bank’s staff. Thus, they could find out whether
interest rate decisions are “due to luck or to technical expertise” (Buiter 1999). But this would
be also possible without a published forecast. It is very unlikely that an incompetent central
bank would permanently set interest rates in way that leads to good outcomes. In other words,
for experts a sequence of correct interest rate decisions would already be a good indication for
technical expertise of the central bank’s staff.
While the information content of an inflation forecast is relatively limited, there is a risk that
its publication can be misinterpreted. A good example is the situation after the ECB’s interest
rate reduction in April 1999. At that time a conditional inflation forecast based on a  short-
term rate of 2.5 % for two years ahead would have led to the result that inflation in the euro
area will exceed the threshold of 2 %. The publication of  this information would have led to a
serious confidence crisis for the euro. It would have been very difficult to explain, why the
ECB is not increasing interest rates although it forecasts that the inflation target will be
missed. The publication of a central bank’s inflation forecast also entails the risk of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. In a relatively large economy like the euro area, wages are the most
important determinant of inflation. Thus, if the ECB makes an inflation forecast, it mainly has
to forecast future wage agreements. As soon as it sees a risk of wage inflation and revises its
forecast upwards, it is very likely that trade unions will base their negotiations on that forecast
so that it will materialise.5.5 No empirical evidence for positive effects of inflation targeting
In sum, is seems not very likely that by adopting the procedures of the Bank of England, the
ECB or the Fed would substantially enhance the ex-ante accountability of their policies. This
conclusion is supported by the lack of empirical evidence in favour of inflation targeting. In
their comprehensive study Bernanke et al. come to the result:
“Inflation targeting has had important benefits for the countries that have used it. Inflation-
targeting countries have achieved lower inflation rates and lower expectations; they
experience less ‘pass-through’ into the inflation rate of shocks to the price level; and they
typically enjoy lower nominal interest rates as a result of lower inflation expectations.”
(Bernanke et al. 1999, p. 6)
But upon closer scrutiny the benefits are much less clear-cut. Even strong supporters of
inflation targeting like Bernanke et al. have to concede:
“Overall, though, we must admit that the economic performance of the non-targeters over the
period considered is not appreciably different from that of inflation targeters.” (Bernanke et
al. 1999, p.283)
Lane and Van Den Heuvel (1998) and Jonsson (1999) come to rather similar results. Johnson
shows that inflation has become less volatile after the introduction of inflation targeting, but
the same effect can be observed in many other industrial countries. Neumann (2000)
compares actual inflation rates with inflation targets. He shows that the United Kingdom and
Germany were most successful in reaching their targets while in the other inflation targeting
countries major divergences between their targets and final outcomes can be observed.
Another serious problem for an assessment of inflation targeting is the fact that all inflation
targeting countries have adopted this strategy after they had already regained low inflation
rates. Thus, there is no evidence on the contribution of inflation targeting in a disinflation
process. And because of the still rather short experience with inflation targeting it is also not
possible to assess its functioning in a period of a world-wide inflation surge.
All in all, there is so far no empirical proof that inflation targeting has positive effects on the
transparency, accountability and thus on the credibility of monetary policy.
6. Implications for the ECBThis sceptical assessment of the merits of inflation targeting does not mean that the ECB
should sit back and leave its “stability oriented monetary policy” as it is.  As already
mentioned, as a first step it would be advisable to reduce the role that this strategy it is
attributing to the money stock M3 as a “reference value” for  monetary policy. Without a
monetary pillar, the ECB’s strategy would be transformed in a one pillar approach. This
would require that the “broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price
developments” obtains a more coherent and thus a more solid structure than now.
A revamping of the ECB’s strategy should above all be guided by an attempt to strengthen the
ex-ante accountability of its policy. A statement by Issing (1999, p. 16) indicates  that so far
the ECB has not paid enough attention to this forward-looking dimension of accountability:
“For purposes of accountability and providing an anchor for expectations, it is important to
provide a quantitative definition of price stability and to emphasise  that  price stability will be
maintained over the medium-term. I do not believe, however, that it is necessarily helpful to
go further and create the impression that monetary policy, by itself, would be able to ‘fine-
tune’ price developments at a certain horizon and to do so on the basis of inflation targeting
alone.”
While we share Issing’s sceptical tone about the usefulness of publishing inflation forecasts, it
seems nevertheless important to enhance the forward-looking dimension of the ECB’s
accountability.
6.1 The role of private inflation expectations
The basis for a revised “stability oriented monetary policy strategy” are  private inflation
expectations. The so-called expectations channel of monetary policy transmission@ shows that
private inflation expectations can be regarded a very important determinant of future inflation,
above all in a relative large economy like the  euro area (Finger 2000). In fact, several central
banks provide intensive information on different indicators of such expectations. Four
different groups of indicators can be distinguished:
•  Surveys of the results of inflation forecasts made by professional researchers. For
instance,  the ECB has conducted a quarterly survey of inflation expectations in the euro
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other survey-based indicators of future price developments (e.g. from Consensus
Economics). Compared with a central bank forecast, such surveys have the advantage of
providing a better diversification of different models and different judgements. As far as
the availability of data is concerned, all important data are published in a timely manner
so that the central bank has no substantial lead over other researchers.
•  Surveys of inflation expectations of households, managers, trade union officials. Such
data are published eg by the Reserve Bank of Australia or the  Bank of England.
•  Indicators of inflation expectations which are derived from financial market data, above
all long-term bond yields and the difference between such yields and the yields of index-
linked gilts.
•  In addition, the results of  wage settlements can be used as very important indicators of
inflation expectations and of future cost pressure. The recent wage settlements in
Germany that even cover the next two years are a very clear indication that the inflation
risks will remain very limited.
6.2 A simple rule for monetary policy
Compared with the highly complicated process of producing an internal inflation forecast,  a
comprehensive survey of inflation expectations provides a relatively simple rule for monetary
policy which can be used for internal decisions as well as for the dialogue with the public. As
long as inflation expectations are identical with the inflation target, the risk of missing the
inflation target is relatively low, especially if the currency area is relatively large so that it is
not very much exposed to the disturbances of exchange rates. If expectations diverge from the
target, there is a strong indication that the central bank has to change interest rates.
Such a simple framework would create an effective external constraint on a central bank’s
discretion. It  allows an objective, permanent and timely evaluation of a central bank’s policy.
If the outside forecasts diverge substantially from the target, a central bank gets under a strong
pressure to justify this evaluation and eventually to adjust its interest rates. This constraint on
a central bank’s discretion is especially powerful, if a central bank (like the ECB) is obliged to
report regularly to the parliament.
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)?This use of inflation expectations in a simple rule does not imply that the central bank has to
react mechanistically to inflation expectations. In the same way, as the proponents of
monetary targeting always envisaged the possibility of a deviation as long as the central bank
can convincingly justify it, a rule based on inflation expectations could always be suspended
as long as  the central bank can provide a good explanation for such a procedure (Bernanke
and Woodford 1997, p. 682)
A central bank’s testimony on private inflation expectations would show at a very early stage
whether a deviation between expectations and target
•  is due to a temporary demand or supply shock to which the central bank does not want to
react because of its medium-term orientation,
•  has been caused by one-time effects like an increase in value-added taxes,
•  is the result of  an inadequate interest rate policy (and expectations of  such a policy)
which would require a correction, or
•  can be explained by a difference between the central bank’s forecast and outside forecasts.
The last situation is the only situation where it would really make sense for the central bank to
publish its own  forecast. It would require that the central bank is convinced that the outside
forecasts are obviously flawed.
6.3 The ECB is already on the right track
All this could be relatively easily implemented by the ECB. As already mentioned, the ECB’s
Monthly Bulletin already reports on private inflation expectations. This should be done in a
more systematic and more regular manner. Above all, these data and their analysis would
require a much more prominent position in the Bulletin. Instead of starting with a boring
description of monetary aggregates and credit growth, the ECB should begin its Bulletin with
a survey of inflation expectations and if necessary an explanation for deviations from the
target. As currently all surveys and financial market data clearly indicate that inflation will
remain close to the 2 % threshold, the ECB would have been well advised to make this much
more public than it does now.  Especially in the last few months such an offensive approach
would certainly have contributed to a better standing of the euro not only on internationalfinancial markets but also in the public opinion. Of course a central bank has always to be
very vigilant as far as inflationary risks are concerned, but the ECB would certainly need
somewhat more self-assurance.
In sum: What the ECB can learn from inflation targeting is the need to base its accountability
on a more forward-looking perspective. But instead of placing its own conditional inflation
forecast in the centre of this process, it should use private inflation expectations in relation to
its inflation target as a simple rule for its own decisions as well as for its dialogue with the
European public and the European Parliament.References
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